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Abstract
In this study we extend agency based research by examining the role of risk in the
structure of managerial compensation and its relationship to organization performance. Our
results suggest that organizations facing higher risk do not place greater emphasis on short
term incentives, they place less emphasis on it. Also, higher risk firms which rely on incentive
pay exhibited poorer performance than high risk firms which de-emphasize incentive pay.
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In recent years, agency theory has emerged as the principal theory guiding
organizational research on the pay- erformance relationship (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990;
Roth & O'Donnell, 1996; Stroh, Brett, Bauman, & Reilly, 1996). Agency theory deals with the
problems of creating a contract governing the exchange between individuals who have
divergent interests (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1983). In the employment
relationship, the basic agency problem is characterized in terms of properly structuring
monitoring and compensation systems to induce self-interested, utility maximizing, risk and
effort averse agents (e.g., managers who want to maximize their compensation and minimize
their effort expenditures) to act on the principal's (e.g., owners who want to increase the value
and performance of their firm) behalf (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Levinthal,
1988). Agency theory seeks to explain the choices principals make about the form and structure
of compensation systems and how those choices are related to the principal's outcomes.
Classic definitions of agency theory posit that an optimal compensation system is
contingent on the need to balance the agent's effort and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1990;
Jensen, 1983; Levinthal, 1988). Agency theory is predicated on the assumption that people
prefer to avoid both work and risk. Thus, the principal's choice is expected to account for these
preferences, structuring compensation systems to induce people to work while at the same time
minimizing, whenever possible, shifting too much risk on them. Although the classic definitions
emphasize the importance of both effort and risk considerations, much of the agency-based
compensation research has tended to overlook risk considerations (see Antle & Smith, 1986;
Janakiraman, Lambert, & Larcker, 1992 for exceptions). This literature has focused almost
exclusively on effort aversion, investigating the efficacy of incentive pay for aligning agents'
behavior in various organizational contexts (Abowd, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990;
Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). By under emphasizing the important
role that risk plays in normative agency theory, this research may tell only part of the story about
whether and when incentive compensation leads to positive organizational outcomes. The
purpose of our study is to investigate whether risk influences the use of base and incentive
compensation and whether risk moderates the relationship between incentive compensation
and firm performance.
Recent research is bringing agency-based compensation research more into line with
classic definitions by considering both risk and effort aversion. Stroh, et al., (1996) found that
environmental turbulence, a concept closely connected to business risk, is negatively related to
the use of incentive compensation. Zajac and Westphal (1994) found that the use of stock
options is negatively related to three measures of business risk in a sample of Fortune 500
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CEOs. In a study of smaller, emerging organizations (i.e., firms engaging in initial public
offerings), Beatty and Zajac (1994) report that the use of incentive pay is influenced by risk
considerations; higher risk IPOs tend to use stock-options less than lower risk companies.
Although the purpose of their study was not to investigate the ultimate effects of risk on firm
performance, Beatty and Zajac (1994) suggest their results affirm theoretical arguments about
its importance in the pay-performance relation.
Our study contributes to this vein of agency research, and extends the work of Beatty
and Zajac (1994), Stroh, et. al., (1996), and Zajac and Westphal (1994), in several ways. First,
we examine whether the degree of risk organizations face moderates the incentive
pay-organization performance relationship. Fundamentally, agency theory focuses on
maximizing organization performance. Previous research has increased our understanding of
the relationship between risk and the use of incentive pay among small organizations (Beatty &
Zajac, 1994;) and CEOs (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Our investigation provides evidence about
the joint effects of risk and incentive pay on organization performance. Second, research
provides limited information about whether agency theory can inform our understanding of
compensation systems of non-CEO employees (Stroh, et al., 1996). Rather than focusing only
on CEOs, our study investigates the efficacy of agency predictions for a set of mangers from
each organization. This matters because the performance of an organization's entire
management team is important for understanding organizational success (Hambrick & Mason,
1984). Third, agency theory explicitly deals with the balance of wages and incentives. Beatty
and Zajac (1994) and Zajac and Westphal (1994) focus on incentive pay, particularly the use of
non-cash incentives (i.e., stock options) and do not analyze pay levels. We investigate the
influence of risk on both pay levels and pay mix (i.e., the balance between incentives and
salary).
THEORY AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
Three fundamental behavioral assumptions underlie agency theory: that both parties are
1) rational and 2) self-interested, and that the agent is 3) both effort and risk averse (Baiman,
1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988). The agent's rational self interest and effort
aversion creates the potential for moral hazard- gents may act to maximize their outcomes (e.g.
compensation) without extending effort toward the principal's objectives (Baiman, 1990;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant & Rao, 1994). The agency problem which results from these
assumptions centers on how to structure monitoring (i.e., the principal's ability to observe or
constrain the agent's actions) and compensation (i.e., the use of behavioral- versus outcome-
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based pay) to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Agency theory defines optimal contracts in terms of maximizing the principal's outcomes
(Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 1992; Levinthal, 1988) and so its predictions focus on how
differences in the structure of monitoring and compensation systems lead to variations in
organizational success (Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; Jensen, 1983). Since performance can be
signaled either by actions or outcomes of those actions (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990), the
principal's primary choice centers on creating the appropriate balance between base
(behavioral-based) pay and incentive (outcome-based) pay which is necessary to induce the
agent to act in the principal's best interests (Baiman, 1990). Optimal compensation contracts
must, therefore, reflect the trade-offs inherent in this balance by using enough outcome-based
pay to align the agent's interests with those of the principal without shifting too much risk and
compensation variability onto the agent (Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).
For the principal, there are costs-including performance trade-offs-for using incentive
pay since it may cause agents to reduce effort, demand higher pay levels, or induce them to
engage in practices designed to reduce the variability of their pay which are coincidentally
detrimental to organizational outcomes (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Ideally,
principals can simply structure compensation contracts in favor of the agent's preference for
fixed pay (e.g., a wage or salary) (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Stiglitz, 1987). The agency
model prescribes that because the agent is also assumed to dislike work, fixed pay is more
likely to be used when the principal can easily observe (monitor) whether or not the agent
engages in appropriate activities. When factors (e.g., task programmability, information
asymmetries; Eisenhardt, 1989)make it more difficult to monitor agents' effort, principals must
rely more heavily on incentive pay to align agents' interests (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kren &
Kerr, 1993).
Much of the recent agency-based compensation research supports the notion that
incentive pay can be useful for aligning the actions of agents with desired organizational
outcomes (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia,
1989). For example, Murphy (1985) studied the pay-performance relationship of 501 managers
in 72 companies and found that, salary, bonus, and total compensation were positively related
to total shareholder return and growth in firm sales. Abowd (1990) analyzed the incentive
pay-firm performance relationship among 225 companies and found that greater use of
incentive pay is positively related to total shareholder return and gross economic return. Other
studies have also found a positive relationship between the use of incentive pay and firm
performance (for a review see Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). The central theme of this research
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has been that when it is difficult for the principal to gain information about the agent's behavior,
outcome-based compensation contracts solve the agency problem (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy,
1988). However, the focus of this research literature has been on effort aversion; concerns
about risk aversion tend to be de-emphasized (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Levinthal, 1988). Given
that effort and risk aversion are given equal prominence in classic agency theory, it is important
to integrate risk into agency-based compensation research to understand whether and how risk
might influence the efficacy of incentive pay for achieving organizational objectives. We explore
these relationships in the sections that follow.
Business Risk and the Use of Incentive Pay
Risk is uncertainty about outcomes or events, especially with respect to the future
(Glickman & Gough, 1990; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Business risk impairs forecasting and
planning activities which makes it harder to create an organizational strategy and plan future
actions (Bettis & Thomas, 1990; Sharpe, 1990). Typically defined as greater variability in
organizational returns and increased chances for corporate ruin (Baird & Thomas, 1985;
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), business risk is of concern to both
principals and agents. For principals, the primary source of concern is whether agents will exert
productive effort toward the principal's objectives. Higher levels of business risk not only make it
more difficult for the principal to determine what actions the agent does take, but also make it
more difficult for the principal to determine what actions the agent should take (Stiglitz, 1987;
Stroh, et al., 1996). Under conditions of greater business risk "...managerial behavior
simultaneously figures more prominently in a firm's future and becomes more difficult to monitor
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985: 1159; Kren & Kerr, 1993)" and the principal cannot easily determine if
the agent's actions "...are being taken in pursuit of the principal's goals or are self-inte st d
misbehavior (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 171)." In other words, greater business risk makes it
difficult to determine whether variations in organizational performance are due to inferior
managerial performance or factors outside of the manager's control (Antle & Smith, 1985).
Classic agency models suggest that solving the agency problem is not a straightforward choice
between monitoring when it is possible, and incentives when monitoring becomes too difficult.
Indeed, the agency literature is ambiguous about how this trade-off should be achieved. We
suggest part of the answer may lie in considering the implications of business risk for agents.
Agency theory's basic risk aversion assumption asserts that agents do not like variability (i.e.,
risk) in their compensation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stiglitz, 1987). We suggest that greater business
risk itself may also impose risk on agents by reducing their income and employment stability.
Since compensation for current performance is usually received at some point in the future,
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more uncertain cash flows or increased chances for organizational failure (i.e., higher business
risk) may make it more difficult for the company to meet its future compensation obligations,
imposing additional risk on all forms of pay. Another potential negative effect of business risk for
agents decreased employment security-is not explicitly considered in most interpretations of
agency theory, yet may exert a strong influence on agents' behavior. According to internal labor
markets theory (ILM), people place great value on employment stability because it protects
them from the vagaries of the external labor market (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Osterman, 1992).
Research suggests that greater risk of employment loss may lead to poor employee
performance, demands for higher pay levels, and reduced commitment to the organization
(Osterman, 1992). Thus, higher business risk, with its concurrent potential for insufficient firm
performance or outright organizational ruin, places the agent's entire employment relationship in
jeopardy. In addition to potentially jeopardizing an agent's pay or employment, higher business
risk also means that external factors which are outside the agent's control may negatively
influence outcome measures thereby reducing the agent's incentive compensation (Antle &
Smith, 1985; Janakiraman, et al, 1992). Industry-wide economic conditions and other external
forces may negatively affect the firm's performance regardless of the agent's actions. These
forces may also impede the agent's ability to positively affect outcome measures. Thus, higher
business risk may reduce or negate the agent's incentives even though the agent is working to
achieve the principal's objectives.
Rather than aligning agents' actions more closely with the principal's objectives, when
faced with greater risk the increased use of incentive pay has the potential to negatively
influence the behavior of agents. Because they are already subject to higher income and
employment risk, agents of higher business risk organizations may react by withholding effort or
taking actions designed to reduce their risk exposure which are coincidentally detrimental to
organizational performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, Turk, & Tyler, 1989; Kren & Kerr, 1993). For
example, managers may adopt detrimental entrenching practices (e.g., compromising
performance measures, neutralizing control mechanisms, adopting deleterious corporate
strategies)(Walsh & Seward, 1990) or fail to take actions that enhance the firm's value (Quinn &
Rivoli, 1993). Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers may use conglomerate mergers,
which are often associated with negative shareholder returns, simply to reduce employment and
earnings risk. Empirical evidence supports this notion. Eisenhardt (1988) found the outcome
uncertainty was negatively related to the use of commissions and positively related to the use of
salaries. Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill (1993) found that outcome-based performance measures
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(e.g., financial controls) were associated with lower investments in research and development
even when such decisions worked against the organization's interests.
We suggest that business risk on its own increases the agents' overall risk exposure by
jeopardizing both the entire employment relationship and the agent's income stream. When
business risk is high, the additional risk imposed by greater use of incentive pay may become
dysfunctional for directing managers' behaviors. Recognizing this potential, we suggest that
principals of higher risk firms will tend to use incentive pay less to avoid increasing agents' risk.
Thus, we expect that higher business risk will be negatively related to the use of incentive pay.
H1: Business risk will be negatively related to the use of incentive compensation in
managerial pay contracts.
Business Risk and Pay Level
Agency theory asserts that agents will accept greater risk if they are provided with some
insurance which helps protect their interests (Conlon & Parks, 1990; Holmstrom 1987). The risk
averse behavior induced by increased use of incentive compensation might be mitigated by
increasing the agent's wealth through higher base pay levels. This idea, which goes back to
Bernoulli (1758/1954), asserts that people's reactions to risk are inversely related to their
current level of wealth; greater wealth makes losses relatively less painful (Bernstein, 1996,
Sharpe, 1990). Greater base pay increases the agent's current wealth thereby offsetting some
of the potential losses associated with both business risk and incentive compensation. Indeed,
classic definitions of agency theory propose that insurance will come in the form of higher base
pay (Baiman, 1990). This premise is echoed in ILM theory which asserts that people will require
higher pay levels in exchange for reduced stability in their employment and future income
stream (Osterman, 1992).
H2: Business risk will be positively related to base pay in managerial compensation
contracts.
Business Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organization Performance
One of the essential features of agency theory is its predictions relating firm performance
to the use of incentive pay (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Previous
agency-based incentive pay research has implicit normative performance implications: Firms
which rely more heavily on incentive compensation will have better subsequent performance.
We should, therefore, observe a positive incentive pay-firm performance relationship. However,
by drawing upon classic agency theory and the internal labor markets and the risk literatures,
we have argued that greater use of incentive pay by higher business risk firms may cause
agents to take actions that are detrimental to firm performance. Thus, we suggest that higher
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risk companies will tend to de-emphasize the use of incentive compensation. This implies that
among higher risk firms, greater use of incentive pay should be negatively related to firm
performance. That is, we hypothesize a negative relationship between higher business risk,
incentive compensation, and firm performance.
H3: For firms with higher business risk, the use of variable compensation is negatively
related to firm performance.
Implications of Managerial Control for the Risk-Incentive
Pay-Firm Performance Relationship
Our discussion and hypotheses so far have assumed a strong principal who makes
decisions about the structure of agents' compensation contracts. However, firms vary in the
control their principals have over the structure of agents' pay. Berle and Means (1932) were
among the first to discuss this notion when they centered on the consequences of separating
management and ownership for managerial behavior. These ideas, referred to as managerial
capitalism, assert that the level of control held by non-ma ager owners influences the actions of
internal managers. Owner-controlled firms are those organizations that have at least one large
external shareholder (i.e., a strong principal) who controls a significant proportion of the firm's
outstanding stock. Outside ownership is essentially a form of monitoring where the major
stockholder has the power to control managerial actions (Werner & Tosi, 1995). In the absence
of such a large shareholder managers are subject to weaker principal control which may allow
managers to manipulate their compensation contracts by reducing the use of outcome-based
pay and increasing base pay, especially when risk is higher. In studies of these assertions, Tosi
and Gomez-Mejia (1989) and Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987) find that the use of
incentives is lower among manager-controlled firms as compared with owner-controlled firms.
Congruent with this research, we posit that HI and H2 will hold more strongly for
owner-controlled firms.
H4a: The relationship between risk and the use of incentive compensation holds more
strongly in owner-controlled firms.
H4b: The relationship between risk and base pay levels holds more strongly in owner-
controlled firms.
METHODS
Data Sources
Three archival data sources were combined for this study. The managerial
compensation data was drawn from Cornell's Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
(CAHRS) compensation data base (Abowd, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). The data
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comprise annual compensation survey data from a major consulting firm for the years 1981 to
1988. The database contains company financial and pay policy data for approximately 740 firms
and individual pay, job, and demographic information for an average of 75 randomly selected
managers from each participating company. The company data include a variety of information
about compensation policies and corporate financial statistics. The individual pay information
includes annual salary, annual bonus, pay range information, job tenure, age, and years of
education. Not all companies participated in the survey each year. Data for some other
companies was incomplete for one or more years and these companies were excluded from the
analysis. For the current analysis, data for over 500 companies and over 150,000 managerial
observations were use over the period 1981 to 1988. The average number of managerial
observations for a firm was 45.98 and the average number of time series was 3.6. Data for
stock market risk were taken from the Center for Research on Security Prices data base
(CRSP). Accounting and financial data were drawn from COMPUSTAT data files (Standard &
Poor's, 1992). We matched the CAHRS compensation survey information to the CRSP and
COMPUSTAT data using CUSIP numbers.
Measures of Business Risk
We drew our measures of risk from previous agency-based compensation research and
the strategy-based risk literature (Antle & Smith, 1990; Janakiraman, et al. 1992; Miller &
Bromiley, 1990). Risk was defined as the volatility in an organization's performance and
measured it in two ways: variation in the firm's income stream and variability in the firm's stock
market returns . We computed systematic and unsystematic components of both risk measures
following the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Modigliani & Pogue,
1993). Systematic risk is the amount of price variation in an organization's income stream (ROA)
or stock returns (RET) that can be explained by changes in the overall market of firms.
Unsystematic risk measures variation in ROA or RET due to factors specific to the organization
itself, such as managerial decisions (Kren & Kerr, 1994; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). We use
monthly stock data over the previous ten year period to compute measures of stock market risk.
A value weighted market portfolio of all stocks in the CRSP data base was the market index. A
separate beta and epsilon were calculated for each year. The risk free return was the U.S.
government Treasury bill rate at time 1. We computed similar measures of systematic and
unsystematic income stream risk using annual accounting data from the previous ten year
period (Ferris & Reichenstein, 1993). The market index was a value-weighted average of all
companies in the COMPUSTAT primary, secondary, tertiary, full, and research data bases for
each year. In the analyses, we use a lagged measure of risk at 1-1 b sed on the premise that
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historical risk will influence current compensation decisions and firm performance.
Compensation Measures
Incentive or performance- ontingent pay refers to that portion of pay that is dependent
upon firm performance (Conference Board, 1993; Milkovich and Newman, 1996). Although
incentive pay includes a variety of forms that are not added into base, bonuses are among the
most common (Hewitt Associates, 1993; McAdams & Hawk, 1994). Bonuses are likely to be
contingent upon current year's firm performance and, thus, are likely to reflect the uncertainty
facing organizations. Our measure of incentive pay was based on the ratio of bonus-t -base pay
derived by dividing a manager's annual bonus by the manager's annual base. Base pay was
measured by the natural log of annual base pay.
We specified two different classes of compensation measures depending on the level of
analysis. Since agency theory predictions are framed in terms of contracts with single agents
and, therefore, involve individual-level pay, we use pay data for individual managers in
Equations 1 through 3. Our investigation of the firm performance-compensation relationship
involved firm-level outcomes. We computed a proxy of firm compensation policies by using the
average pay of all the managers reported by a firm in a single year.
Firm Performance
Since the principal (owners) of the firms in our sample are the owners of its common
stock, we chose a performance measure that reflected changes in the value of the firm to these
shareholders and one which is commonly used in previous research: total shareholder return
(TSR) (Abowd, 1990; Miller and Bromiley, 1990). TSR consists of the year-end closing price of a
firm's stock plus adjusted dividends divided by the stock return from the previous year. It reflects
the one year total gain (loss) a shareholder received for holding the firm's common shares.
Bonuses are typically tied to short-te m measures of firm performance and so our measure of
performance is also short-term. To control for past performance, we use the average return on
equity over the previous 10 years (i.e., t-1 through t-10). The time series data allow us to
analyze relationships from several time periods, but we not that our measures of both
managerial compensation and firm performance are short term. Thus, the time series serve
primarily to measure relationships in several years rather than over an extended period of time.
Ownership
Data on firm ownership were collected from Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) filings. We created indicator variables for firms which had at least one major,
non-managerial shareholder who holds 5% or more of the firm's stock and retained voting rights
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to those shares. The 5% rule is a common cut-off use in research on managerialism
(Gomez-Mejia, et al., 1987).
Control Variables
Firm size has been related to pay levels and may be related to the use of incentive
compensation (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Kroll, Simmons, & Wright, 1990). In our sample total
assets, net sales, common equity, and number of employees were all highly correlated (average
r = .82). We use log assets as a control for firm size in both the compensation and performance
analyses. To further control for firm effects, we include a random intercept for every organization
in the analysis. To control for industry-related factors we included random intercepts for each
two-digit SIC code in our regression equations. We controlled for human capital factors by
including age and organizational tenure in the compensation analyses.
Statistical Models
We estimated the following models to test our research hypotheses:
H1 & H4a:  Incentive Payijt = b0 + b1 Outside Ownerjt + b2 Systematic Riskjt-1 + b3 Unsystematic
Riskjt-1 + b4 Systematic Riskjt-1 * Outside Ownerjt + b5 Unsystematic Riskjt-1 * Outside
Ownerjt + bk Individualijt and Firm Controlsjt + eijt ,  [1]
H2 & H4b: Base Payijt = b0  + b1 Outside Ownerjt + b2 Systematic Riskjt-1 + b3 Unsystematic
Riskjt-1 + b4 Systematic Riskjt-1 * Outside Owners + b5 Unsystematic Riskjt-1 * Outside
Ownerjt + bk Individual and Firm Controls + eijt , [2]
H3: Firm Performancejt = b0  + b1 Outside Ownerjt + b2 Systematic Riskjt-1 + b3
Unsystematic Riskjt-1 + b4 Base Payjt + b5 Incentive Payjt + b6 Systematic Riskjt-1 *
Incentive Payjt + b 7 Unsystematic Riskjt-1 * Incentive Payjt + b8 Firm Performancejt-1 +
bk Firm Controlsjt + ejt , [3]
where,
bk = parameters to be estimated,
i = a manager,
j = a firm,
t = a year,
and eijt and ejt = error terms.
The interaction terms in Equations I and 2 allow us to investigate whether the
relationships between compensation and risk hold more strongly in owner-controlled firms. The
interaction term in Equation 3 allows us to investigate the joint effects of variable compensation
and risk on firm performance. This relationship can be expressed as (Cohen & Cohen, 1983):
[(bIncentive pay + bInteroction * Risk) Pay] + [Intercept + (brisk * Risk)].
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Since our data comprise managers group within organizations which are, in turn,
grouped within industries, we use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Byrk & Raudenbush, 1992;
Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 1996). HLM is specifically formulated to analyze multi-level
data and can account for correlated and heterogeneous variances. It not only reduces or
eliminates concerns about aggregation bias and poor statistical precision, it provides a
mechanism for directly modeling how variables measured at one level, for example firm-leve
risk, effect relations occurring at another, for example this structure of individual manager's
compensation contracts. FILM is also appropriate for unbalanced data since a separate error
term for each firm, adjusted by its sample size, is computed. We utilized an approach that
accounts for the effects of industries on firm-level variables and the effects of firms on
individual- evel variable. We also modeled firm and industry effects as random since we view
our sample of firms as a subset of a larger population of organizations. Goodness of model fit is
assessed in two ways: (1) a significant chi-square value for the reduction in -2 REML log
likelihood between the proposed and alternative models and (2) a reduction in Akaike's
information criterion (AIC)(Littell, et al. 1996).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the data are presented in Table 1. The
data are from relatively high level managers. The average base pay among all managers is
$85,288 with a maximum of $1.2 million. The average bonus is $21,161 with a maximum of $6.0
million. The average bonus-to-base ratio is 19% with a minimum of zero and a maximum of
797%. The sample of firms is relatively larger corporations. Average assets are $1,072 million
and average number of employees is 31,822. Consistent with previous risk research, our
measures of systematic and unsystematic risk are correlated (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972;
Modigliani & Pogue, 1993). Systematic and unsystematic stock market risk are correlated at .42
while the ROA measures are correlated at .32.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable                                        Mean          S.D      1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9        10            
I. log Assets 14.35 1.35
2. Past performanceb .12 .13 .13
3. Total shareholder returnb  .17 .39 0 .04
4. Systematic stock market riskb 1.07 .40 -.15 -.19  -.11
5. Unsystematic stock market riskb  .53 .21  -.31  -.27 -.15 .42
6. Systematic ROAc .008 .01  .02  -.05 -.09  .17 .04
7. Unsystematic ROAc .11 .07  -.16 -.06 -.13 .29 .39 .32
8. log Base payd 11.20 .52 .37 0 -.03 -.02 -.11  0 -.04
9. Incentive ratiod .19 .20 .25 .20 0 -.04 -.06 -.01 -.07 .49
10. Aged 47.20 8.70 .40 0 0 0 .14 .07 -.06  .39  .21
11. Organizational tenured 14.67 10.19   .42 0 .04 -.10 -.27 .05 -.12 .22 .14 .60
aCorrelation coefficients greater than .04 in absolute value are significant at p < .05
bn=2, 513
cn=1,915
dn=197,060
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Risk and Incentive Pay
H1 predicts that greater risk will be negatively associated with the use of incentive pay.
Unstandardized coefficients for the regression of compensation decisions on risk are presented
in Table 2. The chi-square difference and reduction in the AIC are significant for all models. We
found a negative relationship in three of four measures of risk: Systematic stock market risk and
both measures of income stream risk. As a whole, these results support H1. The coefficient for
unsystematic income stream risk is -.38 (standard error [s.e.] = .05, p < .001) and for systematic
stock market risk is -.01 (s.e. = .003, p < .001). Although negative in sign, the coefficient for
systematic income stream risk is not significant. One measure of risk, unsystematic stock
market risk, is positively related to the use of incentive compensation (b = .05, s.e. = .008, p <
.001) which is not consistent with H1. Given the different magnitudes of the coefficients and the
fact that one differs in sign from the others, these data suggest that the way risk is measured is
important. We pursue this finding in more detail in the discussion section.
The data provide mixed information about H4a. Firms with strong outside owners do
appear to de- mphasis the use of incentive pay to a gre te  extent when systematic and
unsystematic stock market risk are higher. The coefficient for the outside owner-by-systematic
stock market risk interaction is -.01 (s.e. = .004, p < .001) and the outside
owner-by-unsystematic stock market risk interaction is -.08 (s.e. = .008, p < .05). Likewise,
outside owners appear to use incentive pay less when unsystematic income stream risk is
higher (b  = -.17, s.e. = -.02, p < .001). Conversely, firms with strong outside owners appear to
emphasize the use of incentive pay more when systematic income stream risk is higher
(Interaction b = .29, s.e. = .12, p < .001). Again, the type of risk appears to be important for
understanding the actions of firms with strong principals.
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TABLE 21
Regression of Risk on Managerial Compensation
(Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses)
Variable                                                   Bonus to base ratio                log(Base pay)             
Log Firm Assets .03*** .20
(.002) (.004)
Age .004*** .02*
(.00007) (.0002)
Organizational Tenure .0008*** -.002*
(.00006) (.0001)
Owner .06*** .10*
(.005) (.01)
Systematic Stock Market Risk -.01*** -.01
(.003) (.008)
Unsystematic Stock Market Risk .05*** .22***
(.008) (.02)
Systematic Stock Market Risk*Owner -.01*** -.06*
(.004) (.01)
Unsystematic Stock Market Risk*Owner -.08*** -.O1 ***
(.008)  (.002)
-2 Log likelihood         -104,297.00          156,540.80
C2 difference                          6,973.00***                            8,775.70***
Reduction in AIC              3,485.72  4,387.60
R2 .31 .39
Change in R2 from model without risk variables .01 .01
N 158,782 158,782
** p < .01, *** p < .001
                                                                                                                                    
1 Random intercepts for each firm and for two-digit SIC codes were included in these models but
are not reported
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable                                                   Bonus to base ratio                 log(Base pay)             
Log Firm Assets .03*** .21
(.001) (.004)
Age .004*** .02***
(.00006) (.0002)
Organizational Tenure .0008*** -.002
(.00006) (.0001)
Owner .01*** -. 03
(.002) (.006)
Systematic Income Stream Risk -.01 0.02
(.21) (.50)
Unsystematic Income Stream Risk  -.38*** .23
(.05) (.13)
Systematic Income Stream*Owner .29**  .10
(.12) (.20)
Unsystematic Income Stream*Owner -.17*** .42***
(.02) (.04)
-2 Log likelihood         -110,229.00         159,605.10
C2 difference   1,041.00***                   5,711.40***
Reduction in AIC 519.32 3,155.5
R2 .31 .39
Change in R2 from model without risk variables .01 .01
N 154,200 154,200
** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Risk and Pay Level
The results from the pay level analyses support H2 since greater risk is positively related
to the use of base compensation, but the manner in which risk is measured is again important.
The results are presented in Table 2. The chi-square difference and reduction in the AIC are
significant for all models. The coefficient for unsystematic stock market risk is .22 (s.e. = .02, p <
.01) and for unsystematic income stream risk it is .23 (s.e. = .13, p < .0 ). Base pay levels are
not related to either measure of systematic risk. The coefficients for ownership-by-risk
interactions are significant. Thus, these data provide mixed support H5b. The coefficients for
higher systematic and unsystematic stock market risk, owner-c ntrolled firms are -.06 and -.01
(s.e. = .01 and .002, p < .001) and for systematic and unsystematic income stream,
owner-controlled firms are .10 (s.e. = .20, n.s.) and .42 (s.e. = .04, p < . 01). These findings
indicate that firms with strong outside owners reduce pay levels in reaction to stock market risk
and increase them in reaction to income stream risk, suggesting that differences in the meaning
and measurement of risk is important.
Risk, Pay, and Firm Performance
We analyzed the relationship between compensation and risk measures on firm
performance by including an interaction term. The results are presented in Table 3. The
reduction chi-square and AIC are significant for all models. We recognize that our performance
analyses have limitations since we were unable to control for all exogenous factors which might
influence firm performance or the use of incentive compensation. Since agency theory posits
that a principal's choice of compensation scheme has implications for the firm's performance,
our performance analyses do provide some evidence about the efficacy of these agency-based
predictions. Consistent with H3 the results indicate that higher levels of risk and higher
variability in pay may be associated with lower firm performance. We note that base pay levels
are positively related to firm performance. The coefficients for base pay in the two models
are.04 (s.e. -.02, p < .001), results which are consistent with previous research (Levine, 1993).
Incentive pay is, however, negatively related to firm performance suggesting the main effect of
incentives is to reduce firm performance. The main effects for risk indicates it is also negatively
related to firm performance; the coefficients for systematic stock market risk and both measures
of income stream risk are negative and significant. The interaction effects indicate that higher
risk firms which use more incentive pay may have lower firm performance, but again the manner
in which risk was measured matters.
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TABLE 3a
Regression of Risk and Incentive Compensation on Firm Total Shareholder Return
(Cells are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses)
Variable                                                      Coefficients                       Coefficients             
Past Performance -.11** -.11
(.006) (.06)
Log Firm Assets -.02* -.01
(.009) (.008)
Age -.003 -.003
(.004) (.004)
Organizational Tenure .006**  .006**
(.003) (.003)
Owner .03 .02
(.02) (.02)
log Base Pay .04*** .04**
(.02) (.02)
Incentive Pay .14 .15
(.20) (.20)
Systematic Stock Market Risk -.12*** ____
(.03 ) ____
Unsystematic Stock Market Risk .08 ____
(.08) ____
Systematic Stock Market Risk - Incentive Pay .08 ____
(.16) ____
Unsystematic Stock Market Risk - Incentive Pay -.53* ____
(.33) ____
Systematic Income Stream Risk ____ -2.12*
____ (1.25)
Unsystematic Income Stream Risk ____ -.44***
____ (.18)
Systematic Income Stream Risk*Incentive Pay ____ 2.95
____ (5.03)
Unsystematic Income Stream Risk*Incentive Pay ____ -.10
____ (.80)
-2 Log Likelihood          1,109.05 1,063.39
C2 difference 242.32*** 33.45***
Reduction in Akaike's Information Criterion 111.69 16.28
R2  .06 .06
Change in R2 from model without risk variables.02 .01
N           1,773.00           1,800.00
* p <.05 ,** p < .01, *** p < .001
                                                                                                                                    
a Random intercepts for each firm and for two-digit SIC codes were included in these models but
are not reported
Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance                                                                                               WP 97-23
Page 20
To determine the joint effects of risk and incentive pay on firm performance, hypothetical firms
were created (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Hypothetical high risk firms were created by assuming a
level of risk which is one standard deviation above the sample average. Then, low and high
incentive conditions were set by establishing bonus-t -ba e rations one standard deviation
above and below the sample average. Holding all other variables at their means, the difference
total share holder return (TSR) for a high unsystematic stock market risk/high incentive firm
incentives is -.025 versus .047 for a high unsystematic stock market firm/low incentive firm, a
difference of .075 in raw TSR. This is not only a 288% improvement for the low incentive firm,
but it moves its performance from negative to positive returns. A similar improvement in
performance is evident for high unsystematic income stream risk firms. In this case the TSR for
the high risk/low incentive firm is 20% better than for the high risk/high incentive firms although
high unsystematic income stream risk firms tend to experience negative returns, all else equal.
Incentives do not affect performance of high systematic income stream risk firms, and higher
incentives are related to better performance among high systematic stock market risk firms
although the performance these high risk firms is negative regardless of the amount of
incentives used in managerial compensation contracts. These results indicate that the effects of
incentive pay on organizational performance is dependent upon the level of business risk. And,
how risk is defined and measured clearly has implications for understanding the relationship.
DISCUSSION
Sources of Risk, Compensation Decisions, and Firm Performance
Our results raise questions about the predictions made by some previous agency-based
compensation research regarding incentive pay. The data suggest that organizations facing
higher risk do not place greater emphasis on sh rt-term incentive pay, indeed they place less
emphasis on it. In addition, higher risk firms which relied more heavily on incentive pay tended
to exhibit poorer performance than higher risk firms which de-emphasize incentive
compensation. Including risk considerations appears to substantially alter the observed
pay-performance relationship. These results suggest that the employment contract is more
complex than modeled by previous agency research which has tended to emphasize the use of
performance contingent pay. Furthermore, the results suggest that considering risk, in any form,
may be more important than incentive concerns. That is, striking the incentive-r sk sharing
balance may require paying more attention to risk sharing than to effort aversion. Since some of
the results differ somewhat depending on how risk was measured, it may be possible that
decision makers might react differently to different sources of risk. In our data, the observed
Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance                                                                                               WP 97-23
Page 21
relationships were stronger for measures of firm-specific or unsystematic risk. Likewise, owners'
reactions differed depending upon the source of risk. We also find that compensation decision
makers adjust the balance between base and incentive pay in reaction to risk. Higher risk firms
tended to increase base pay and decrease incentives when risk is higher. Consistent with
Levine (1993), pay level decisions in our sample have implications for firm effectiveness: higher
base pay was positively related to firm performance. This highlights the need to focus on the
entire compensation contract and not just the incentive portion.
A better understanding of the conditions under which agency predictions hold might be
gained by examining different sources of risk and how they are related to compensation
decisions. Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Collins and Ruefli (1994) review a number of different
operationalizations of risk which may be worthy of exploration. Beatty and Zajac (1994) use
measures of risk which were intended to tap sources of uncertainty particular to IPOs.
Application of these types of measures may be informative. Much remains to be learned about
the dimensions of risk and their relationship to organizational strategy and outcomes (Collins &
Ruefli, 1994; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Even so, research has shown that risk influences firm
performance (Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Our study extends that research by indicating risk might
also influence other strategic performance relationships. In addition, we did not deal directly with
low risk firms. Perhaps they have greater flexibility in how they can structure compensation
contracts. This too is an important area for further research.
Effects of Risk on the Structure of Managerial Compensation
We suggest that the typical description of agency theory tells only part of the story. That
is, principals might act to align agent behaviors through the use of incentive pay schemes, but
its effect on an agent's behavior may be more complex than typically assumed. We have
suggested that greater risk may impose greater uncertainty on the entire employment
relationship and that firms reduce (rather than increase) the variability in pay to offset this
increased risk (Simon, 1951). Agency theory asserts that any risk premium paid will be in
response to greater variability in pay and internal labor markets theory asserts that employees
will require higher base pay to offset increased income and employment insecurity. Indeed, we
found that risk is positively related to base pay. However, these firms are not emphasizing
incentive pay. Higher base pay may be a response to the uncertainty imposed on the agent's
overall employment contract by greater firm risk. That is, agents may be defining their utility in
terms of employment security, stability of their job responsibilities, or other aspects of their
contract, not just their pay. Perhaps greater organizational risk is interpreted by agents as
indicating greater potential for variability in their overall employment relationship. Simon (1951)
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argued that employees would be willing to bear the brunt of uncertainty in the employment
relation in exchange for a premium wage. In this sense, our data concur with Simon's
assessment. Simon (1991) argues that the moral hazard and opportunism assumptions have
lead agency theory to incorrectly rely on monitoring and compensation as the only remedies for
self-interested behavior. He asserts that loyalty and identification with organizational goals are
as important as compensation for motivating the effort required for firm success. This suggests
that compensation is one element of a set or bundle of valued returns which motivate employee
actions. It might be fruitful to extend the conceptualization of returns beyond pay and toward an
investigation of the collection of returns (e.g., cash pay, benefits, perks) necessary to motivate
actions in higher versus lower risk situations.
Redefining Risk in Agency Relationships
In addition to concerns about risk in pay, we suggested that agent behaviors might also
be influenced by perceptions about other sources of risk in the employment relationship,
including employment security. Recent research on employment contracts indicates employees
are concerned about the length of the employment relationship, among other conditions
(Rousseau, 1995). Thus, managers may not passively allow the principal to foist risk on them.
Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill (1993) found that managers in higher risk situations tended to
undertake actions to reduce risk (e.g., decrease R&D expenditures). Our data support this
notion since the observed ,relationships differed depending upon whether the manager was in a
manager- or ownercontrolled firm. However, across ownership groups, the costs of inefficient
risk sharing seem to be of concern when companies place greater emphasis on outcome-based
pay. We could not investigate specific behavioral or attitudinal side-effects of increased
emphasis on incentive pay in higher risk situations, but these are important issues for future
study. We need to know more about how employees process risk in the employment
relationship, especially risk related to pay and other general employment factors such as risk of
a lay-off, loss of promotion, or chance for unfavorable assignments.
Importance of Contextual Factors
We controlled for one contextual factor which may moderate the agency relationship: the
nature of firm ownership. Our use of the presence of large external shareholders was to adjust
for strong principals and the ability of agents, in this case managers, to manipulate their
compensation contracts (Tosi & Gomez-M jia, 1989). Research suggests that other proxies for
firm control variables are related to managerial compensation, measures we were unable to
include in our analyses. A prominent candidate is the ability of managers to manipulate the
firm's Board of Directors (Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990; Westphal
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& Zajac, 1994). For example, the number of BOD members appointed by the CEO may be
positively related to the CEO's ability to manipulate his or her compensation and that of other
senior managers (Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Lambert, et al. 1993). This research is complementary to
that on managerial capitalism because it depicts managers as willing to manipulate their income
through political means. In addition, we only controlled for industry effects and did not attempt to
explain how they might influence the relationships we studied. Since almost all of our industry
indicator variables are highly significant, and since there are both positive and negative
coefficients, closer examination of industry effects seems warranted. Another potential
explanation for these results is that higher risk firms simply lack the financial resources to pay
their employees competitively. However, given the fact that our data were drawn from very
large, well established firms, this alternative explanation seems less plausible. Investigating
firms from a wider sample of organizations, which includes both small and large firms, might
lend additional information to answer this question.
Risk, Long-term Incentives, and Firm Performance
An area that is in great need of study is the relationship between long-t rm i centive
pay, risk, and firm performance. Beatty and Zajac (1994) have shown that the use of long-term
incentive pay is related to business risk. We need to know more about the risk-long-term
incentives--organizational performance relationship. Agency theory is relatively ambiguous
about how short- and long-term incentive pay might exert different influences on subsequent
firm performance. Since longer-t rm incentive pay is a large part of many manager's pay
packages (Bloedorn & Chingos, 1994), examining the interaction of long- and short- erm pay
and risk on firm outcomes is important. Some theorists suggest that incentive pay might cause
managers to focus excessively on short-run profits and ignore the long-term value of the firm.
Clearly, the long-term focus of some forms of compensation might exhibit a greater relationship
to strategic decisions which have a pay-off at some future date. In this case, based upon our
findings about the importance of how risk is measured, the measurement of both risk and firm
performance may be critical.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Our study is the first to test the predictions agency theory makes about the relationship
between risk, pay, and firm performance, but it is not without limitations. The data are 10 years
old and were drawn from larger companies in the U.S. As exemplified by Beatty and Zajac
(1994), smaller, more entrepreneurial businesses would provide another, perhaps unique, data
source for analyzing the relationship between risk, compensation and firm performance. The
age of our data may limit generalizability if business conditions are significantly different now
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from those of 10 years ago. Our human capital controls did not account for factors such as
education or functional expertise which might be important omissions. There are possible
concerns about missing variables although we attempted to mitigate this by using a proxy of
past performance. Controlling for all exogenous factors which might be related to performance
or compensation decisions remains a difficulty in conducting all pay-performance research.
Even so, we believe that compensation research must begin to address the links between
compensation decisions and firm outcomes even in the face of potential statistical issues. Since
most decisions about compensation systems are made with the intention of influencing future
employee behaviors, we believe studying the relationship between compensation decisions and
subsequent firm performance is important. The challenge researchers face is to create
sufficiently elaborate data bases to conduct this type of research and to conduct research that is
cumulative.
If principals do attempt to align agent behaviors through incentive pay, the actual
measures use to determine incentive compensation payouts are important. While our data did
not provide the actual measures upon which incentives were based, our study does provide
some indication of the importance since some results differed depending upon how risk was
characterized. For example, the association between risk, pay, and performance might be
positive when a clear performance target is established, employees believe they can effect the
performance target, and pay is truly contingent upon changes in the target. Under such a
scenario we would expect a positive relationship, even if the firm was pursuing a more risky
strategy.
In sum, we believe that more must be learned about the employee's perspective as it
relates to agency models. Simply assuming a risk averse agent does not capture the full range
of attitudes and behaviors employees exhibit under risk. It does not adequately specify how
agent's reactions to risk are moderated by different sources of risk and other elements of the
employment contract. Understanding how employees react to risk in the employment
relationship, especially risk related to compensation, would better inform organizational decision
makers about how pay can support strategic business objectives.
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